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Abstract
This paper studies an adaptive arti￿cial agent model using a genetic algorithm to analyze
how a population of decision-makers learns to coordinate on the selection of an equilibrium or a
social convention in a two-sided matching game. In the contexts of centralized and decentralized
entry-level labor markets, evolution and adjustment paths of unraveling are explored using this
model in an environment inspired by the Kagel and Roth (2000) experimental study. As an
interesting result, it is demonstrated that stability need not be required for the success of a
matching mechanism under incomplete information in the long run.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
In the labor markets where agents seek employment, the contract dates sometimes shift far earlier
than the start of employment. This dynamic phenomenon, known as unraveling, causes ex-post
ineﬃciencies in market matching even though it may lead to an equilibrium. Contracts are made
before most of the needed information becomes available in markets in which unraveling is observed.
There are many real life examples of markets, where better quali￿ed agents choose to contract
earlier than less quali￿ed agents who wait to make contracts until the start of employment. Elite
colleges have both early and regular admission programs. Another example can be seen in pro-
sports draft selections in the USA.1 Post-season college football bowl selections and entry-level
labor markets for judges and for medical interns are examples of natural experiments involving
unraveling.
This study will focus on entry-level medical intern-hospital labor markets in Britain. It will
explore the nature of strategic behavior in these markets. Centralized institutions were established
to control the dates of contracts in these markets. The entry-level medical intern labor markets
in Britain are regional. We assume that almost every region is similar to the others in terms
of the preferences of agents and information structure. Therefore, the only diﬀerence between
these markets appears in the manner through which agents are appointed. British markets employ
diﬀerent mechanisms to match interns and hospital consultants to each other. These markets
are not competitive. Wage negotiations do not exist. The markets are organized mostly in an
oligopolistic structure that gives all the power to the hospital consultants in the design of these
matching mechanisms. The jobs last only six months, so initial appointments are binding.
Kagel and Roth (KR) (2000) consider a study similar to the environment here. In that study,
they conduct a laboratory experiment on the mechanisms used in Britain. Unver (2000b) works
on an extended experiment. This study will be a complement to the KR (2000) and to the Unver
(2000b) studies, and will answer the questions regarding the success of matching mechanisms using
computational methods.
The basic properties of these labor markets are given in section 2. After proposing matching
games to explore unraveling in these markets in section 3, we will study game theoretic properties of
these matching games in section 4. Then in section 5, we will propose the use of an adaptive arti￿cial
agent model using a genetic algorithm (GA), to analyze the strategic behavior that employees and
employers follow to adjust to an equilibrium from diﬀerent initial conditions. This model will be
used to analyze the genetic evolutionary strategic behavior of arti￿cial agents who can be viewed
as learning over time which strategies are best to adopt. In section 6, evolution experiments
are simulated to examine diﬀerent properties of institutions that are used to control the dates of
1Roth and Xing (1994), Li and Rosen (1998) present several other examples.
2contracts. Robust features of evolution will be examined.
This essay allows us to explore an adaptive arti￿cial agent model, that can be used in combi-
nation with laboratory experimentation and even with ￿eld applications. This model can be used
in equilibrium selection of a wide variety of equilibria of the matching game.
One interesting result will be the demonstration of how some theoretically unstable mechanisms,
namely linear programming (LP) mechanisms, may not lead to early contracts under the assumption
that agents learn in an evolutionary manner and initially randomize their rank-order lists. This
m a yh e l pe x p l a i nt h e￿eld success of LP mechanisms used in Britain.
1.1 A Brief Literature Survey on Two-Sided Matching
An experimental study by KR (2000) works on a similar environment to the one handled in this
study to analyze timing of transactions. They consider two mechanisms. The main result of the
experiment is that lower levels of early contracts are observed in a stable deferred acceptance (DA)
matching market than in an unstable priority matching market. More quali￿ed agents make early
contracts; less quali￿ed do not arrange early under the unstable priority mechanism. Both type of
agents do not make early contracts under the stable mechanism.
The Unver (2000b) study, an extension to the KR study, shows that a LP mechanism will not do
as well as a stable DA mechanism in terms of preventing harmful early contracts in the laboratory.
Agents do not game their preferences in an optimal way and the ￿nitely repeated play of the games
in the experiment is not as long as the computational markets considered in this study. But, it
decreases the unraveling occurred in the decentralized markets.
The timing of transactions in an entry-level labor market framework has been studied by Roth
and Xing (1997) to investigate the turnaround time and bottlenecks in market clearing for clinical
psychologists.
Game theoretical properties of the two-sided matching mechanisms employed in Britain are
studied by Roth (1991b). Roth and Xing (1994), Li and Rosen (1998) and Sonmez (1999) study
the unraveling issue in a theoretical framework. Roth and Rothblum (1999) search advice to
participants in two-sided matching markets.
Entry-level labor markets have been studied in the two-sided matching framework (see Roth and
Sotomayor, 1990 for a theoretical background and motivation) through the marriage and assignment
models. The links between the theoretical framework of Gale and Shapley￿s (1962) marriage model
and the applied frameworks observed in the ￿eld (such as the entry-level labor markets for American
physicians, osteopaths, dentists, lawyers, sororities, judges, etc.) are established by Roth (1984),
Roth and Sotomayor (1990), Mongell and Roth (1991) and in the above mentioned studies. Roth
(1990) gives a survey about these markets.
31.2 Coevolution in Games with Multiple Populations
However, all of these listed studies except KR￿s (forthcoming) and Unver￿s (2000b) investigate the
problem in a mainly static and cooperative framework. These do not exactly describe the reasons
why some unstable mechanisms (such as the London and Cambridge hospitals￿ selection process
for medical interns) are still in use.
Some other recent studies involving market transition behavior relax the ￿best response play￿
hypothesis of game theory. In place of best response, these studies have adopted an evolutionary
dynamic to update the strategy choices. This dynamic is partly adapted from biological research.
Each agent selects strategies in a game theoretic setting in proportion to their relative ratio in the
population. Evolution continues over time in each repeated play of a game.
Admission markets are perfect settings for application of this hypothesis. Workers change every
year, but they have strong incentives to adapt the experience of the previous generation. Firms
are usually the permanent players. They learn from the previous year￿s experience. Equilibrium
selection and the nature of the adjustment process can be examined thoroughly with diﬀerent
evolution dynamics. We will use a GA for analysis in a computational framework.
Entry-level labor market games possess multiple equilibria which re￿ect diﬀerent modes of
coordination of two diﬀerent sides of agents (workers and ￿rms). In matching games, enumeration
of the huge strategy space2 is quite diﬃcult. Any analytical evolutionary concept with a ￿xed
set of strategies seems limiting the complex nature of the games. As proposed by Fudenberg and
Levine (1998), GAs seem the best hope in exploration of the strategy spaces using arti￿cial agents.
Therefore, we will focus on GAs.
1.2.1 Description of a Genetic Algorithm
Basically, a GA is a computational tool that permits adaptive optimization or evolution over time,
using genetics-based operators and assumptions of biological evolution. In a game theoretic setting,
a GA is a technique that helps in the analysis of evolution dynamics and determines paths to a
social equilibrium concept or a social convention. GAs search strategy spaces on the trade-oﬀ
between exploration and exploitation of results achieved by diﬀerence equation and calculus-based
procedures.
By mutating, crossing over, and reproducing strategies, a ￿population￿ of existing strategies in
a game can be replaced to form new strategies as the oﬀspring. An existing set of strategies of
agents is called a generation. The ￿tness of the strategy measures the success of a strategy in a
generation after a tournament against all strategies in that generation. Using this measure, parent
strategies are selected to produce oﬀspring, which makes up the next generation.
2For example, in a ￿mixed game￿ considered in this study there are 7￿7￿2
7 =6 2 7 2meaningful ￿rm strategies,
as programmed in the GA..
4GAs are used in the economics literature generally to ￿nd evolution dynamics in macroeconomic
models, where social learning is a major concern. Overlapping generation models and general
equilibrium frameworks are two of the applications of evolution programming in economics. In
game theory, GAs can be applied to complicated games where the strategy sets are too large for
learning models such as the Roth and Erev (1995) model, the Camerer and Ho (1999) model or
stochastic ￿ctitious play. They can support laboratory experimentation via similarities between
evolution strategies and actual human strategies. As an example, Miller (1996) investigates the
evolved automata of a repeated prisoners￿ dilemma using a GA. As another example, Andreoni and
Miller (1995) use a genetic algorithm in auction market simulations to ￿nd evidence to support the
behavior observed in laboratory experiments. Technical and some theoretical issues regarding the
application of a GA are addressed by Goldberg(1989), Holland (1992), Judd (1998) and Michalewicz
(1994).
The reproduction and crossover process of the GA can be interpreted as the transmission of
experience between generations of agents. Since the KR (2000) experiment treats also workers
as permanent players across generations and since we base our matching game design on this
experiment, we use the same genetics-based learning for both ￿rms and workers. Agents of the
same type will use the same reproductive selection. We will also consider only symmetric strategies.
2 The Two-Sided Matching Markets in Britain
The reader can follow Roth (1991b) for a detailed discussion of the matching markets in Britain.
In summary, the matches for consultant and medical intern pairs were realized in a decentralized
manner at the beginning of the century in Britain. However, unraveling appeared in these markets.
Almost simultaneously, many regions adopted diﬀerent centralized matching mechanisms to prevent
unraveling. A mechanism is a function from the set of preferences to the set of matchings. In
practice, computers process rank-order lists submitted by agents to produce a matching according
to the mechanism. .
In several of the areas, including Newcastle, Birmingham and Edinburgh (1967), the unraveling
problem could not be resolved although centralized but unstable ￿priority￿ matching mechanisms
were introduced. They were abandoned after ￿eld trial. A mechanism is unstable if a preference
pro￿le exists for which the produced matching is unstable. A matching is unstable if a ￿rm and a
worker exist who prefer each other rather than their matches or an agent exists who prefers staying
unmatched rather than being matched to the partner assigned.
Several regions were successful in preventing the problem by introducing centralized mecha-
nisms. Roth (1991b) argues that stability determined the winners. Indeed, the successful Edin-
burgh￿69 and Cardiﬀ mechanisms were adaptations of stable mechanisms.
5But there are two unstable mechanisms still in use in the London and Cambridge regional
markets of Britain. These, called LP mechanisms, have not been subject to the unraveling problem.
Therefore, they deserve attention, because stability may not be a necessary condition for survival
of a centralized mechanism in the ￿eld.
2.1 Description of Centralized Matching Mechanisms
2.1.1 Priority Matching Mechanisms
The mechanisms introduced in Newcastle, Birmingham, and Edinburgh (1967) give a priority rank
to each match, according to the preferences of agents, and matches are realized from the highest
to the lowest priority. Details of the algorithms are given by Roth (1991b).
The Birmingham and Newcastle mechanisms give a priority to a consultant-intern pair as fol-
lows: First note that in a (k,l) match, the consultant lists the student l￿th, the student lists the
consultant k￿th in the rank-order lists. The number of such a match is k ￿ l. Smaller numbered
matches have higher priorities.
Priorities are ￿lexicographic￿ in consultants￿ preferences for the Edinburgh (1967) mechanism.
If k<lthen a (x,k) match is favored before a (y,l) match for any value of x,y.I fk = l and x<y
then a (x,l) match has a higher priority than a (y,k) match.
These mechanisms are unstable and have unraveled, so they were abandoned (see example 1 in
appendix A). (1,1) matches are guaranteed to be realized by these priority mechanisms.
2.1.2 Linear Programming Matching Mechanisms
The mechanisms introduced in London and Cambridge solve an assignment problem to ￿nd a
matching. Shah and Farrow (1976) and Roth (1991b) give details of the algorithms. After weights
a r ea s s i g n e dt oe a c hp o s s i b l ep a i rw i t hr e s p e c tt othe submitted rank-order lists, they are summed
up for potential pairs in each matching. The resulting weights are used in an integer programming
problem to ￿nd a matching that maximizes these weights. For our purposes, the problem reduces














(iii)0 ≤ xf,w ≤ 1 ∀ f and w
(1)
where αf,w is a weight. xf,w =1denotes a match between f and w, xf,w =0denotes no match
in the solution.
Diﬀerent regions use diﬀerent methods to determine these weights. In the London region,
weights are determined by summing up the ￿rm￿s weight for the worker and the worker￿s weight
6for the ￿rm in a pair. These individual weights are decreasing in rank of agent in the rank-order
list. In the Cambridge region, the weight for a pair is ￿lexicographic￿ in consultant￿s preferences.3
Although they are unstable, these algorithms have survived and are still in use. One hypothesis to
account for their survival is that it is easy for the agents to adjust to the system by manipulating
their rank-order lists (see Shah and Farrow, 1976). (1,1) matches may not be realized (see examples
1 and 2 in appendix A).
2.1.3 Deferred Acceptance Matching Mechanisms
The mechanisms introduced in the Edinburgh (1969) and Cardiﬀ regions are adaptations of Gale
and Shapley￿s (1962) stable mechanisms.
In modeling Edinburgh (1969 and later) and Cardiﬀ markets, it will be assumed that these
markets use one-to-one DA mechanisms. The Edinburgh (1969) mechanism will be approximated
b yt h ec o n s u l t a n tp r o p o s i n gD As c h e m e ,a n dt h eC a r d i ﬀ mechanism will be approximated by the
intern proposing DA algorithm. The consultant proposing DA algorithm can be stated as follows for
future reference. Suppose Q is the rank-order list pro￿le submitted, that is the vector of rank-order
lists submitted by each consultant and student.
At the ￿rst step, each consultant, f, proposes to his most favored intern with respect to Q(f).
Each intern, w, holds only the best consultant￿s proposal with respect to Q(w) if that is acceptable
to her; she refuses all others.
At any other step, each consultant, f, who does not have an oﬀer held by an intern proposes to
the remaining most favored intern with respect to Q(f). Each intern, w, holds only the best oﬀer
with respect to Q(w) among all the new proposals at this step and the oﬀer held from the previous
step.
When no oﬀers are rejected at a step, the algorithm terminates and tentative agreements are
realized as matches.
These are stable mechanisms, in the sense that the matching produced is stable with respect to
the submitted rank-order list pro￿l e .T h e yh a v en o tu n r a v e l e da n da r es t i l li nu s e .
3For the London mechanism, we use the weights 36,28,21,15,10,6 for choices 1,2,3,4,5,6 and a negative weight
for an unlisted choice (as given in Shah and Farrow, 1976). A (1,1) match has the weight 72. (1,2) and (2,1)
matches have the weight 64, and so forth. For the Cambridge mechanism, we use the weights 9 for (A,A), 8 for
(A,B), 7 for (A,C), 6 for (B,A), 5 for (B,B),4 for (B,C),3 for (C,A),2 for (C,B) and 1 for (C,C) matches. We
assign, a negative weight for unacceptable matches ((U,x) or (x,U) where x can be A,B,C or U for unacceptable).
For the Cambridge mechanism, an arti￿cial agent￿s rank-order list translates as ￿rst listed choice A, second and third
B,f o u r t h ,￿fth and sixth C. We assume that agents can make one A,t w oB,t h r e eC choices.
73 An Incomplete Information Model for Unraveling
We begin with an entry-level labor market model of n ￿rms (set F)a n dm workers (set W).
In order to motivate the British experience, this study considers a market that clears at three
consecutive rounds. We will refer to consultants as ￿rms and to interns as workers in our model.
(Some preliminaries about the cooperative two-sided matching theory are given in appendix A.)
The games considered are partially adopted from the KR (2000) laboratory experiment, because
this is the only work that studies human dynamics in unraveling markets. So, we can compare
our results with those of that study. We also adopt primary computational values from these
experimental games. First, we consider a decentralized matching game.
3.1 The ￿Decentralized￿ Matching Game
This game has three periods: In round −2,a￿rm has the option to make an oﬀer to one worker
and a worker has the option to accept one oﬀer. An accepted oﬀer binds parties for an early match.
Round −1 is a replay of round −2 among the players who have not made a contract in round
−2. Similarly, round 0 consists of replay of round −1 among the players who have not made early
contracts yet. The rounds diﬀer from each other in terms of the costs of contract. A match in
round −2 has the cost $2 , round −1 matches cost $1 and round 0 matches do not incur any costs.
Application of these costs is motivated by the decrease in planning ￿exibility. Next, we consider
mixed games.
3.2 The ￿Mixed￿ Matching Games with Decentralized Early Oﬀers
These games have also three periods: in each of the rounds −2 and −1 a ￿rm has the option to
make an oﬀer to one worker and a worker has the option to accept one oﬀer. A contract is costly.
Round 0 is replaced by a centralized market. Agents submit rank-order lists, these are processed
by a centralized mechanism. We study two diﬀerent early contract technologies. Through the ￿rst
contract technology, we assume that early contracts are tentative. Agents only commit to list each
other in ￿rst place in round 0 rank-order lists. They freely ￿ll the rest of rank-order lists. The
second contract technology studies the case in which these contracts are binding. Only agents who
do not make early contracts participate in the mechanism matching and they do not pay any costs.
The costs of early contracts are set to $2 in round −2, $1 in round −1. A cost is charged regardless
of whether the contract was successful or not.4 The ￿rst two rounds are exactly the same in the
binding contract mixed games and in the decentralized game. In all the games, agents are not
informed about the early matches and about the early oﬀers and acceptances/rejections.
4￿Mixed matching games with early decentralized oﬀers￿ will be referred as ￿mixed matching games￿ from now
on.
8These contract technologies are motivated by the British experience where agents have to par-
ticipate in the mechanism match. Since priority and DA mechanisms turn (1,1) lists into a match
these two technologies coincide strategically.
In summary, we consider 10 diﬀerent Bayesian games: a decentralized game, mixed games under
3 priority matching mechanisms, 2 DA markets, and tentative and binding contract treatments of
2 LP markets.
3.3 The Partially Correlated Preferences
The preferences of agents are determined by partially correlated rank-order lists. There are two
disjoint set of players, workers and ￿rms. Each ￿rm and worker is of one of the two types, ￿high
productivity￿ or ￿low productivity￿. n/2 ￿rms are high, n/2 ￿rms are low productive types.
Similarly, m/2 workers are high and m/2 workers are low productive types. The types of agents
are common knowledge. We will only consider n =6and m =6in our learning simulations.
The utility of a ￿rm f from a worker w can be given by
uf(w)=tw + θf,w (2)
with θf,w ∼ g, a density function.
Similarly for a worker w, the payoﬀ from a ￿rm f can be given by
uw(f)=tf + θw,f (3)
with θw,f ∼ g where the primary computational values are
tv=
‰
5 if v is a low type agent
15 if v is a high type agent
for agent v (4)
and g = U(−1,1), the uniform density with the support [−1,1].W h i l etf and tw are common
knowledge, θw,f is private to w and θf,w is private to f. The net payoﬀ of an agent in the market
is the utility she gets from being matched minus the early contract cost. The net payoﬀ of being
unmatched is zero for an agent v, even if she made an unsuccessful early contract.
4 Strategic Behavior in the Stage Games
Suppose FH = {f1,...,f n/2} is the set of high ￿rms and let FL = {fn/2+1,...,f n}be the set of low
￿rms. Similarly de￿ne WH and WL. Let the set of high agents be H = FH ∪ WH and the set of
low agents be L = FL ∪ WL. Let P be the true preference pro￿le of agents, the realization of the
partially correlated preference pro￿le e P.L e tP be the set of those pro￿les where the preferences
are rational and admissible by the partially correlated preference distribution. P(v) is only known
by agent v, while the distribution of e P is common knowledge. A preference pro￿le is rational if
it is transitive and complete. Admissible preferences always rank high agents strictly preferred to
low agents who are preferred to being unmatched. De￿ne U,U(v) and e U for the utility values and
the set U similarly. De￿ne the pure strategy of agents in the Bayesian games for each realization
9of utilities by a function s : U → Sc onto the set of complete information strategies from the set
of utility pro￿les. Let productivity types be de￿ned as T = {FH,W H,W L,F L}.L e tS be the set
of pure strategies. Let strategies be de￿ned in terms of rank-orders instead of identities of agents.
For example, a strategy might specify that a ￿rm makes its ￿rst oﬀer to its highest ranked worker,
at period −1.A s t r a t e g y s ∈ S is symmetric if it is employed by every agent in a type that is
sv(U(v), e U−v)=sv0(U(v0), e U−v0) ∀ v,v0 ∈ T ∀ T ∈ T .W e w i l l s a y a w o r k e r w ∈ W and a ￿rm
f ∈ F unravel if they arrange in rounds −2 or −1 in any of the games.
In examining stability under incomplete information, we will use ex-post stability and instability
(i.e., stability and instability of the outcome matching for all possible realizations of the preference
pro￿les).
The next section considers some of the equilibrium properties of the 10 games considered in
this study.
4.1 The Equilibria
Here we will concentrate on symmetry, thus the outcomes will be simple lotteries over matchings
for symmetric strategies.
Lemma 1 Under the binding contract mixed Bayesian games with the priority and DA mecha-
nisms, symmetric strict equilibria exist, whose outcomes match all agents, involve no mismatches
between high and low types of agents, and involve no early contracts. (See appendix B for a sketch
of proof.)
There may or may not exist such equilibria for the LP mechanisms depending on the weighing
schemes. For the weights considered here, such equilibria do not exist:
Lemma 2 There does not exist any pure strategy symmetric equilibrium whose outcome matches
all agents, involves no mismatches between high and low agents, and involves no early contracts for
the mixed Bayesian game with the LP mechanisms under the binding contracts. (See appendix B
for sketch of proof.)
4.2 Incentive Compatibility of Mechanisms under Incomplete Information
It can be shown that the DA mechanisms are incentive-compatible for this information structure
and utility parameters (i.e., each agent has a truthful revelation in response to everybody else￿s
truthful revelation of preferences.)5 However, the priority and LP mechanisms are not.
5Under complete information, no incentive compatible mechanism exists. See Roth and Sotomayor (1990).
10Lemma 3 T h eD Am e c h a n i s m sa r ei n c e n t i v e - c o m p a t i b l eu n d e rt h ep r o p o s e dm o d e l . T h a ti st h e
strategy s such that s(P)=P for any P is an equilibrium in the direct revelation game. (See
appendix B for sketch of a proof.)
5 Genetic Evolution
In order to model a behavior that determines the adjustment paths of arti￿cial agents to an equi-
librium or a social convention, a genetic algorithm (GA) is used. This study will be interested in
the evolution of strategies and the dynamics of markets. The evolution and the adjustment process
will be the primary concern, not the steady-state evolution stage. The evolution of market behavior
will be examined after the adoption of new market organizations. For example, we examine the
change in behavior after decentralized markets are replaced by mixed markets.
The basic GA,6 which is run independently SN number of times to determine the average
behavior using Monte Carlo experimentation, is stated as pseudo-code in ￿gure 1.
Figure 2 shows the representation of the strategies in the GA. Under this representation, each
string represents a valid strategy, although some parts of the string can be redundant.
The average simulated behavior is determined after SN =3 0runs of the basic algorithm.
The number of agents in each side are set as m = n =6 . The values of parameters and genetic
operators can be chosen freely, and do not aﬀect the ordering of the results to be presented as
will be described later. The speed and magnitude of adjustment dynamics can be calibrated by
these parameters. For the simulations presented here, the following parameter values are chosen:
p =0 .90, the crossover probability, q =0 .05, the mutation probability. The number of generations
is determined as DG =4 0decentralized market game generations followed by 120 mixed game
generations, a total of G = 160 generations. The population of strategies is determined to be
4st =2 8(st =7for each type).7 The number of reproduced best strategies is set to be h =1 .8
6 Evolution Experiments for Random Initial Strategies
First, we present some of the terminology used to de￿ne the properties of the experiments in the
graphs in appendix 3. The average total cost of unraveling is the total cost incurred by all players
6The genetic algorithm, all the matching mechanisms, and the games are coded in PASCAL and run on a IBM-
PC compatible machine. PASCAL implementations of ￿Numerical Recipes￿ routines by Press et. al (1996) are used
whenever needed.
7Increasing the population size is very expensive in terms of CPU run-time. For example introducing a new
strategy to each type (i.e. increasing population size from 28 to 32)i n c r e a s e st h eC P U - t i m eb y1.71 times (slightly
less then doubling the CPU run-time).
8The number of plays of a single strategy in the tournament of the genetic algorithm is therefore 7
3 =3 4 3 .T h e
￿tness of the strategy is the sum of the average payoﬀs the strategy earns for the three agents of a type in these 343
plays.
11Figure 1: The Genetic Algorithm
For i =1to SN,simulation number
1 Randomly generate the initial population st of strategies for each type T =High
￿rms, high workers, low ￿rms, low workers.
2F o rg =1to G,n u m b e ro fg e n e r a t i o n s
2.1 Generate a preference pro￿le using the partially correlated preference dis-
tribution.
2.2 Conduct a tournament among each strategy of each type, treating them as
symmetric strategies.
2.2.1 If g ≤ DG, decentralized game generation, then use decentralized game
in the tournament.
2.2.2 Otherwise use one of the centralized games in the tournament
2.2.3 Fitness of a strategy is sum of payoﬀs strategy achieves in each play
2.3 For k =1to h,h i g h e s t￿tness strategy number, reproduce the highest ￿tness
strategies for each type.
2.4 For k =1to st − h, crossover the parents linearly for each type.
2.4.1 Randomly choose four parent candidates C1,C 2,C 3,C 4 for each type
among the current generation.
2.4.2 The higher ￿tness strategies of C1,C 2 and C3,C 4 become the two parents
P1,P 2 for each type.
2.4.3 With probability p crossover the parents P1,P 2, with probability 1 − p
directly clone the parents as the oﬀspring (Bernoulli density).
2.4.3.1 Randomly draw a crossover ￿joint￿ digit in the strategy string of
the size ￿length.￿
2.4.3.2 Copy the digits 1,..,￿joint￿ of P1 and ￿joint￿ + 1 ,..., ￿length￿
digits of P2 to form the child O1.
2.4.3.3 Copy the digits 1,..,￿joint￿ of P2 and ￿joint￿+1,...,￿length￿ digits
of P2 to form the child O2.
2.5 Mutate each digit in the oﬀspring strategies of each type with probability q
(Bernoulli density).
2.5.1 For mutation of oﬀer/acceptances draw a digit from {1,2}.
2.5.2 For mutation of rank-orders draw a digit from {1,2,3,...,m} for a ￿rm
strategy ({1,2,3,...,n} for a worker strategy).
12Figure 2: Representation of strategies as ￿integer￿ strings in the genetic algorithm for games with
two early oﬀer rounds
THE DECENTRALIZED GAME ￿FIRM￿ STRATEGY STRING
o−2r−2 − o−1r−1 − o0r0
ot ∈ {1,2}:1f o ro ﬀer, 2 for no oﬀer in round t ∈ {−2,−1,0}
rt ∈ {1,...,m}:the rank-order of the worker to make an oﬀer in round t ∈ {−2,−1,0}
THE DECENTRALIZED GAME ￿WORKER￿ STRATEGY STRING
a−2r−2 − a−1r−1 − a0r0
at ∈ {1,2}: 1 for accept, 2 for reject the best oﬀer in round t ∈ {−2,−1,0}
rt ∈ {1,...,n}: the threshold rank-order of the best ￿rm whose oﬀer is accepted in round t ∈
{−2,−1,0}
ANY CENTRALIZED GAME ￿FIRM￿ STRATEGY STRING
o−2r−2 − o−1r−1 − r0,1r0,2 ...r 0,m
ot ∈ {1,2}:1f o ro ﬀer, 2 for no oﬀer in round t ∈ {−2,−1}
rt ∈ {1,...,m}: the rank-order of the worker the ￿rm makes an oﬀer to in round t ∈ {−2,−1}
r0,1r0,2 ...r 0,m:l e n g t hm rank-order list of the ￿rm for round 0 (r0,k ∈ {1,...,m})
ANY CENTRALIZED GAME ￿WORKER￿ STRATEGY STRING
a−2r−2 − a−1r−1 − r0,1r0,2 ...r 0,n
at ∈ {1,2}: 1 for accept, 2 for reject the best oﬀer in round t ∈ {−2,−1}
rt ∈ {1,...,n}: the threshold rank-order of the best ￿rm whose oﬀer is accepted in round t ∈
{−2,−1}
r0,1r0,2 ...r 0,n:l e n g t hn rank-order list of the worker for round 0 (r0,k ∈ {1,...,n})
The space of rank-order lists consider all possible misrepresentations and truncations of the pref-
erences.
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Figure 3: Evolution with Random Initial Strategies and with Rank-Order List Updating
14by making early contracts in rounds −2 and −1 in one generation of a simulation. Firm oﬀer rates
in a round are determined for both types. In that round, the ratio of ￿rms making an oﬀer for a
contract to currently unmatched ￿rms of the type is considered. The low worker acceptance rate
is the ratio of low workers accepting a best oﬀer to the current number of unmatched low workers
who receive at least one oﬀer in that round. The high worker acceptance rate is diﬀerentiated from
the low worker acceptance rate, since low ￿r m sa l m o s ta l w a y so ﬀer early contracts to high workers
and almost always workers reject the oﬀers. Therefore, the high worker acceptance rate is de￿ned
as the ratio of high workers who accept an oﬀer from a high ￿rm to the high unmatched workers
who receive at least one oﬀer from a high ￿rm. The average number of early contracts is the total
number of contracts in the society done in rounds −2 and −1 respectively. Basically, costs, the
number of early contracts, and oﬀer/acceptance rates will be indicators of the evolution dynamics.
6.1 Results
The basic model is considered with 30 independent runs of the basic GA, each of 160 generations
(40 decentralized +120 decentralized/mixed market games).9 The basic payoﬀsa r ee m p l o y e da s
$15 for (average) high, $5 for (average) low, $0 for unmatched. The costs for early contracts are
imposed as $2 for round −2, $1 for round −1, $0 for round 0 contracts. As described before, these
values are adopted from the KR (2000) laboratory experiment. We study the experiments involving
decentralized markets, mixed games with the priority, DA and LP matching mechanisms under the
tentative and binding contracts. We study these experiments from random initial strategies. In the
￿rst mixed game generation, the rank-order lists are generated randomly and then are updated in
the following generations. We permit a random rank-order list to start from an arbitrary ￿rm (or
work) rank-order, and to be terminated by any truncation. The evolution paths look qualitatively
like the KR (2000) experiment for the priority and DA markets. The dynamic comparisons between
the acceptance and oﬀer rates, and costs qualitatively hold for both GA and laboratory evolution.
Figures 3-6 summarize the results outlined in this section.
6.1.1 The Decentralized Matching Game
In the decentralized treatment, it is observed that the total cost of unraveling increases after initial
generations (as seen in ￿gure 3a). As seen in ￿gures 3b and c, high agents are observed to make
more early contracts than low agents after experience accumulation. This is because high agents
have higher opportunity costs to avoid mismatches. Round −1 matches are higher in number than
round −2 matches as seen in ￿gures 4b and c.
9After the end of decentralized markets, the schemata that represent actions in rounds −2 and −1 are communi-
cated to the ￿rst generation of centralized game as schemata for actions in rounds −2 and −1.I nr o u n d0, the initial
rank-order lists are randomly determined by discrete uniform density.
15-             Number of Arrangements           - 
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.           Actual Payoff Gained to           .    







1 . . 5
6 . . 1 0
1 1 . . 1 5
1 6 . . 2 0
2 1 . . 2 5
2 6 . . 3 0
3 1 . . 3 5
3 6 . . 4 0
4 1 . . 4 5
4 6 . . 5 0
5 1 . . 5 5
5 6 . . 6 0
6 1 . . 6 5
6 6 . . 7 0
7 1 . . 7 5
7 6 . . 8 0
8 1 . . 8 5
8 6 . . 9 0
9 1 . . 9 5
9 6 . . 1 0 0
1 0 1 . . 1 0 5
1 0 6 . . 1 1 0
1 1 1 . . 1 1 5
1 1 6 . . 1 2 0
1 2 1 . . 1 2 5
1 2 6 . . 1 3 0
1 3 1 . . 1 3 5
1 3 6 . . 1 4 0
1 4 1 . . 1 4 5
1 4 6 . . 1 5 0
1 5 1 . . 1 5 5








Figure 4: Evolution with Random Initial Strategies and with Rank-Order List Updating
16.        High Firm Offer Rate          . 





























































































































.         High Worker Acceptance           . 




























































































































.         Low Firm Offer Rate           .




























































































































.         Low Worker Acceptance            .






























































































































Figure 5: Evolution with Random Initial Strategies and with Rank-Order List Updating
6.1.2 The Mixed Matching Games
Introduction of the centralized mechanisms makes unraveling costs fall dramatically as seen in
￿gure 3a. This is caused by low agents who literally stop making early matches (see ￿gure 3c).
Under the stable DA mechanisms and the LP markets, unraveling costs approach zero in the
long run (see ￿gure 3a). With random initial conditions, the priority markets perform most poorly
under evolution in terms of costs. The major diﬀerence between the DA, LP, and priority markets
appears in the acceptance ratio of high workers in round −1 (see ￿gure 6b). In the DA and LP
markets, almost all high workers reject high ￿rm oﬀers in round −1. However the priority market
high workers continue accepting a substantial ratio of high ￿rm oﬀers in round −1.
The LP markets are also diﬀerentiated among themselves. The Cambridge mechanism leads to
more early contracts than the London mechanism. However in general, when the contracts are bind-
ing, agents adapt to the mechanism and do not circumvent it. The costs and acceptance/oﬀer rates
fall further, when we consider the tentative contract technology. The binding contract treatment
produces a comparable number of ex-post market matching blocking pairs with the DA mecha-
nisms. However priority matching markets produce a much higher number of ex-post blocking
pairs. The tentative contract treatment of the LP markets produces the lowest numbers (see table
171). The tentative contract technology, by itself, presents an evolutionary evidence for the reasons
unstable LP mechanisms are still in use and stopped unraveling.
6.1.3 Strategy Evolution
Each treatment￿s strategy evolution converges to diﬀerent sets. The ￿tness of a strategy shows
the rate of increase of the population of a speci￿c schema. A ￿schema￿ is a speci￿c portion of the
strategy code. For example, ￿rst and third digits in the ￿rm strategy representation are the early
oﬀer schema. In the experiments, the oﬀer/acceptance schemata in the strategies are diﬀerent.
Ap r i o r i t ym a r k e th i g hw o r k e r ss t i l lt e n dt oa c c e p to ﬀers from the high ￿rms in round −1.( I n
Newcastle, the percentage of such schema is 27.85% in generations 121 − 160.) In the DA and LP
markets, schema involving no acceptances in rounds −2 and −1 are in the highest ratio. (For
example the Edinburgh￿69 market involves such schema 59.77% of the population in generations
121 − 160, for the London market under tentative contracts 56.23%.) We do not observe a clear
convergence in the rank-order submission schemata of the mechanisms. However the length of the
rank-order lists are shortest under the LP markets and longest under the DA market for the high
agents.
6.1.4 Eﬃciency of Mechanisms
We consider the total payoﬀ to maximum payoﬀ r a t i of o ram e a s u r eo fo v e ra l le ﬃciency. According
to this measure, the LP market agents reach 97.4% of total payoﬀ under the tentative contract
treatment, 96.5% under the binding contract treatment. The DA market agents reach 96.3%, the
priority market agents reach 92.5%, in the decentralized markets agents obtain 73.5%.
6.2 Summary for Randomly Chosen Initial Strategies
We use a regression model to ￿nd the diﬀerences between evolution processes of the ￿average
total cost of unraveling￿ under 10 diﬀerent markets/institutions with our random initial condition
experiments. One of the models is presented below. Note that we ￿n das t r o n ga u t o r e g r e s s i v e
process for the error terms. Therefore, we make a 2-step feasible GLS estimation by ￿rst estimating
φ a n dt h e ne s t i m a t i n gr e g r e s s i o nc o e ﬃcients. We present the average total cost of unraveling as:
ci,g = βi + αi
g−g0 + γuv(vH)+εi,g
εi,g = φεi,g−1 + ηi,g
for i denoting one of the 10 market treatments. ηi,g
i.i.d. ∼ N(0,σ2) and g, generations, change
from 41 to 160 (i.e., the era after the arti￿cial agents gain experience in the decentralized market)
18Table 1: Statistics from Experiments with Rank-Order List Updating and with Random Initial
Conditions


































































































































































































19.         High Firm Offer Rate           .
























































































































.         High Worker Acceptance           . 
























































































































.         Low Firm Offer Rate          .





























































































































.         Low Worker Acceptance            . 





























































































































Figure 6: Evolution with Random Initial Strategies and with Rank-Order List Updating
so that g0 =4 0 , uv(vH) is the average payoﬀ from a high agent ($15 in original, $10 in subsequent
experiments), αi the speed parameter for decrease in cost, βi the constant dummy coeﬃcient denote
the market speci￿cc o e ﬃcients for 10 of the markets/institutions with their relevant subscripts i.10
Table 2 presents to feasible GLS estimates of coeﬃcients. Table 3 presents some simple hypotheses
testing results. We use market speci￿c variables to capture the individual eﬀects of each of the
mechanisms after pooling all data to estimate γ. We change the average payoﬀ from the high
type agents in some of the simulations. This captures the payoﬀ eﬀects. This is particularly
important because the KR (2000) study includes diﬀerent sessions when high type agent payoﬀs
are on average $10 and $15. On average their ￿ndings conjecture a direct relationship between the
cost of unraveling and average payoﬀ from the high types. We try to characterize those eﬀects in
our regression equation and in our GA model. To capture the indirect relationship between cost
and generations after g0 =4 0 ,w eu s e 1
g−g0 as one of the regressors.11
The payoﬀ coeﬃcient (γ) is found positive and signi￿cant. Therefore, we ￿nd the same payoﬀ
10The subscripts are NE for the Newcastle priority, BI for the Birmingham priority, ED
067 for the Edinburgh￿67
priority, ED
069 for the Edinburgh￿69 DA, CR for the Cardiﬀ DA, LO for the London LP and CM for the Cambridge
LP mechanisms. We use DC to denote the decentralized markets.
11We also run diﬀerent linear regressions using diﬀerent regressors such as log generation. Those usually give similar
results with those found below in presence of AR(1) process.
20Table 2: 2-Step Feasible GLS Coeﬃcients
GLS Coeﬃcients Estimate Standard Error t statistic p value
∧
γ 0.0553 0.0119 4.6550 0.0000
Speed Coeﬃcient Estimates
aNE priority 4.5417 0.2733 16.6190 0.0000
aBI priority 5.0818 0.2360 21.5284 0.0000
aED067 priority 4.9885 0.2359 21.1465 0.0000
aED069 DA 5.7941 0.2359 24.5613 0.0000
aCR DA 5.7859 0.2359 24.5268 0.0000
aLO−tent. LP 5.6910 0.2359 24.1243 0.0000
aCM−tent. LP 6.2455 0.2359 26.4747 0.0000
aLO−bind. LP 5.8518 0.2359 24.8063 0.0000
aCM−bind. LP 5.6796 0.2363 24.0373 0.0000
aDC decentralized 1.8476 0.2359 7.8321 0.0000
Constant Dummy Coeﬃcient Estimates
bNE priority 2.0030 0.1990 10.0676 0.0000
bBI priority 1.8949 0.1942 9.7557 0.0000
bED067 priority 2.0997 0.1940 10.8228 0.0000
bED069 DA 1.0146 0.1940 5.2295 0.0000
bCR DA 1.1203 0.1940 5.7745 0.0000
bLO−tent. LP −0.0206 0.1940 −0.1064 0.9152
bCM−tent. LP 0.4336 0.1937 2.2385 0.0253
bLO−bind. LP 0.7292 0.1940 3.7587 0.0002
bCM−bind. LP 0.9752 0.1911 5.1034 0.0000
bDC decentralized 5.5505 0.1940 28.6092 0.0000
coeﬃcient of determination: 0.7389
∧
φ =0 .8366 Wald stat= 5548.5 p =0 .0000
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Cost of l.p. tent. tech. and
bind. tech. are equal:
f =1 8 .2170
p =0 .0000
2,2386 rejected





Cost of priority and d.a. mech.
same:
f =1 7 .0391
p =0 .0000
4,2386 rejected
Cost of priority and l.p. bind.
tech. same:
f =2 5 .3097
p =0 .0000
4,2386 rejected
Cost of all centralized mecha-
nisms equal under bind. tech.:
f =2 0 .6003
p =0 .0000
6,2386 rejected
eﬀect that KR found in their laboratory experiments. The average cost of unraveling is aﬀected by
the payoﬀ from high types directly. Following table 3, the null hypotheses involving the equality
of speed of decrease in average cost within the priority mechanisms, within the LP mechanisms
under the tentative transactions, within LP mechanisms under the binding contract technology, and
within the DA mechanisms are not rejected. The slowest decrease is seen under the decentralized
market, followed by the priority matching markets. DA mechanism and LP mixed games with
binding transactions lead to comparable speeds of convergence, although DA mixed market speeds
seem faster. The fastest decrease is observed under the LP mixed markets with tentative transaction
game. The next test asks whether the speed of decrease is equal under two diﬀerent institutional
restrictions in the LP markets: hypothesis is not rejected. Then, we determine whether the DA
and LP mechanisms under binding technology generate similar processes: the speed estimates are
not signi￿cantly diﬀerent. We test whether speed coeﬃcients of priority and DA markets are the
same: the null hypothesis is rejected. It is next tested whether speed coeﬃcients of the priority
and the LP markets under the binding technology are the same: the null hypothesis is rejected.
Then, we test whether all the centralized mechanisms are have the same convergence speed under
the binding contract technology: the coeﬃcients are not equal to each other. The next set of tests
are about the asymptotic values of costs under the mixed mechanisms. This asymptotic estimate
23is determined to be b ci,g for g = 160. So we test whether ai
120 + bi =
aj
120 + bj for diﬀerent markets
i and j. Following table 4, the binding early contracts produce similar results within the LP and
within the DA markets. The order of the asymptotic costs can be given as: decentralized markets
> priority mixed markets > LP mixed markets with binding transactions and DA mixed markets
> LP mixed markets with tentative transactions. One can follow table 3 and 4 for the statistic
values of the tests mentioned above.
We also make a sensitivity analysis for the GA evolution.12
7C o n c l u s i o n s
This study considers the adjustment dynamics of agents to three types of two-sided matching
mechanisms that came into use in the ￿eld in Britain after a decentralized matching era. Unraveling
is studied with speci￿c matching games with several rounds of clearance. We use a GA in the
evolutionary programming framework. Static game theoretic analyses fail to explain the ￿eld
success of a class of theoretically unstable mechanisms. Analytical evolutionary analyses seem
12Sensitivity Analysis: Same experiments are run for diﬀerent parameter values under the ceteris paribus assump-
tion:
Genetic Operator Changes:
Increase in the mutation rate: The uniform mutation rate for each digit of the strategy strings is increased from
Decrease in the crossover rate: The uniform crossover rate is decreased from
Change in the reproduction operator: We adopt biased-roulette-wheel selection instead of ￿rst-past-the-post. Ac-
cording to selected bias, we observe slower convergence and higher costs.
Change in the crossover operator: Instead of linear crossover, we consider circular version. The convergence results
occur slightly faster; we observe lower costs.
Change in the initial conditions: Suppose that instead of random rank-order list generation in round 0, we consider
truthful revelation (straightforward) of rank-order lists in the centralized games. In the short run, the LP markets
unravel ￿most￿ under both communication technologies. The priority markets unravel earlier than the DA markets
do but not as much as the LP markets do. In the long run we return to our prior ￿ndings: the LP markets under the
tentative arrangement technology unravels least, which are followed by the DA and LP markets under the binding
arrangement technology. Finally, priority markets unravel most in the long run. (See ￿gure 7.)
Change in Strategy Form: When we assume agents only decide for oﬀer and acceptances but do not make deci-
sions on rank-order lists instead always submit full truthful lists, we observe that DA mechanism is most successful
algorithm. Priority and LP tentative, LP binding treatments have less success in preventing early contracts. Next
section￿s simulations consider these kinds of strategies.
Changes in Model Parameters:
We consider two changes in the model parameters.
The ￿rst one is increase in the range of the random parameter in the payoﬀ: The random parameter θf,w for
￿rm f for each w and θw,f for the worker w for each f (described in section 3) are drawn from U(−2.5,2.5) instead
of U(−1,1) independently and identically. The average cost of unraveling is observed to increase for the unstable
markets slightly and decrease for the stable markets slightly. Under the binding arrangement technology, deferred
acceptance markets lead to comparable levels of unraveling with the linear programming markets. Both lead to lower
number of early arrangements than the priority markets.
The second is a change in the average payoﬀ from the high type agents: Average payoﬀ from the high, tv when
v is a high agent is then set to $10 and $100 respectively instead of $15.W h e ni tw a ss e tt o$10, the total cost of
unraveling on average fell for all the markets, and when it was set to $100, the total cost of unraveling on average
increased for all the markets over tv =1 5(for v is high) levels. The major diﬀerence was the rate of acceptances
done by the high workers in round −1. The rates were highest for tv =1 0 0(for v is high) and lowest for tv =1 0(for
v is high). Also high ￿rms make more oﬀers in round −1 for tv =1 0 0(for v is high).







































.          Cost of Unraveling:          . 



































.           Cost of Unraveling:           .



































Figure 7: Evolution with Random Initial Strategies for the Decentralized Game, Truthful Initial
Rank-Order Lists for the Mixed Games, and with Rank-Order List Updating
25limited to examine the complex matching games for equilibrium selection. The main contribution
of this paper is a dynamic analysis of unraveling using GAs.
The GA serves as an evolution environment to study learning under incomplete private infor-
mation. The learning occurs through communication and transmission of experience. Following
KR￿s (forthcoming) experimental design, we assume that both ￿rms and workers are permanent
players.
In summary, decentralized market evolution leads to unraveling for both better and less quali￿ed
agents. Less quali￿ed agents do not unravel once mixed mechanisms are introduced. We ￿nd
asymptotic evolution paths with low levels of unraveling for highly unstable LP markets. These
are also successful in the ￿e l di nB r i t a i n . W e￿nd also qualitative evidence for plausibility of an
evolution process in KR￿s (forthcoming) experiment. The unstable priority matching mechanisms
that failed in the ￿eld and laboratory also perform most poorly in the evolution environment in
terms of costs.
The diﬀerence between the priority and LP mechanisms arises from the intrinsic optimization
procedure used in the LP mechanisms. For agents, manipulation of rank order lists occur under the
mixed games.13 The diﬀerence in the evolution stage indicates that early oﬀers and acceptances
are in higher percentages under the priority mechanisms than they are under the LP mechanisms.
When we consider diﬀerent initial conditions, the stability results hold only asymptotically. For
example, if inexperienced agents submit truthful rank-order lists as they would in the laboratory,
￿LP markets unravel the most￿ in the short run.
In the literature, the unraveling issue has mostly been considered in a static framework. However
￿eld results show that, unstable mechanisms that are not susceptible to unraveling do exist. It seems
necessary to consider models of adaptive behavior to illuminate the dynamics observed in the ￿eld
when new market institutions are introduced. Computational tools of modern game theory present
such opportunities.
Appendix A. Preliminaries about the Marriage Model (Section 3)
Marriage model is used to analyze the unraveling problem in entry-level labor markets. The
models in the literature are based mostly on works of Roth, Sotomayor, Gale and Shapley. Here, this
general framework will be presented brie￿y. The set of players N = F ∪W (such that F ∩W = φ)
consists of the set of ￿rms F = {f1,f 2,...,f n} and the set of workers W = {w1,w 2,...,w m} where
each ￿rm can hire one worker, while one worker can work for one ￿rm. The preferences of each
worker w ∈ W over ￿rms and herself are denoted by P(w), an ordered list of elements in {w}∪F.
13We ran several arti￿cial agent simulations for the Unver (2000a and b) studies in which agents always submit
truthful lists. We do not permit gaming of preference lists in these simulations. Under this implementation, the
LP mechanisms are not as successful as the DA mechanisms are. They perform poorest with the priority matching
mechanisms. Therefore manipulation of rank-order lists seems as an important factor in success of LP mechanisms.
26Similarly the preferences of each ￿rm f ∈ F over workers and itself, P(f) is an ordered list of
elements of {f} ∪ W. All preferences are assumed to be rational (i.e., complete and transitive).
Let ￿≥P(v)￿ denote ￿weak preference￿ relation and ￿>P(v)￿ denote ￿strict preference￿ relation with
respect to the preference list P(v), the component of the preference pro￿le P for the agent v.A
worker w is acceptable given P(f) to ￿rm f if w ≥P(f) f. Similarly a ￿rm f is acceptable given
P(w) to worker w if f ≥P(w) w.L e tP =( P(f1),...,P(fn),P(w1),...,P(wm)). Now suppose P
is the set of rational and admissible preference pro￿les on N so that P ∈ P.
We can now de￿ne a one-to-one matching.
De￿nition 4 A one-to-one matching ￿ in the market is a function de￿ned on the set of players.
Formally ￿ : N → N. ￿ satis￿es ∀w ∈ W and ∀f ∈ F:
(i) ￿(w)=f if and only if w = ￿(f),
(ii) ￿(w)=w,i f￿(w) / ∈ F,a n d
(iii) ￿(f)=f,i f￿(f) / ∈ W .
Workers (￿rms) have preferences over matchings identical to their preferences over ￿rms (work-
ers) and themselves. A matching ￿ is said to be individually rational given P(v) if ∀ v ∈ N
￿(v) ≥P(v) v. A matching ￿ is stable given P, if it is individually rational given P and if there
exist no f ∈ F and w ∈ W such that ￿(w) 6= f, w> P(f) ￿(f) and f> P(w) ￿(w).Let M be the set
of matchings de￿ned on N.
There exists at least one stable matching for any set of players and rational strict preference
pro￿les.14 Am a t c h i n gm e c h a n i s m,i sd e ￿ned by a function π : P → M.Am e c h a n i s mi ss t a b l e
within P if there exists no P ∈ P such that π[P] is unstable. A mechanism is individually rational
within P if π[P] is individually rational for all P ∈ P. Unless otherwise denoted, let π denote also
the matching π[P] under the true preferences P. A matching problem is denoted by a set of ￿rms,
a set of workers, a preference pro￿le and a mechanism such as (F,W,P,π).
Suppose that preferences of agents over individuals are strict. Therefore, suppose that P is
further restricted in this sense. There exists a unique stable matching ￿W which is weakly preferred
to any other stable matching by all workers in W, at least one of the weak preferences is strict.
M o r e o v e rt h e r ee x i s t sau n i q u es t a b l em a t c h i n g￿F which is weakly preferred to any other stable
matching by all ￿rms in F, at least one of the weak preferences is strict. ￿F is known to be
the ￿rm optimal stable matching. ￿W is known to be the worker optimal stable matching.15 Firm
proposing DA algorithm determines ￿F given the rank-order lists Q, worker proposing DA algorithm
determines ￿W given the rank-order lists Q. The other mechanisms are described in section 2. Let
P(v,k) denote the kth ranked agent in the preference of v ∈ N,P(v).A m a t c h b e t w e e n ￿rm f,
and worker w is a (k,l) match given the rank-order list pro￿le Q if Q(f,l)=w and Q(w,k)=f.
14Theorem proven by Gale and Shapley (1962)
15A result by Gale and Shapley (1962)
27One simple example can show that the Birmingham priority, ￿BI, the London LP, ￿LO,m e c h -
anisms are unstable. Reader can verify for other priority and LP mechanisms.
Example 5 If P(f1)=( w1,w 2,w 3), P(f2)=( w2,w 1,w 3), P(f3)=( w2), P(w1)=( f3,f 2,f 1),
P(w2)=( f3), P(w3)=( f2,f 1) then ￿BI(f1)=￿LO(f1)=w1, ￿BI(f2)=￿LO(f2)=w3, ￿BI(f3)=
￿LO(f3)=w2. For the London LP mechanism, this creates the weight 57 for (1,3)+57 for (3,1)+72
for (1,1) = 186 as maximum. The only stable matching is ￿(f1)=w3, ￿(f2)=w1, ￿(f3)=w2.
It creates the weight 49 for (3,2) + 56 for (2,2) + 72 for (1,1) = 177. Note that w1 >P(f2) w3 and
f2 >P(w1) f1
Also (1,1) matches might not be realized under the London LP mechanism. It can also be
veri￿ed for the Cambridge LP mechanism.
Example 6 If P(f1)=( w3,w 2,w 1), P(f2)=( w2,w 1,w 3), P(f3)=( w2,w 1,w 3), P(w1)=( f3,f 2,f 1),
P(w2)=( f3,f 2,f 1), P(w3)=( f2).Then the highest weighted matching ￿ that realizes f3,w 2 (1,1)
match is ￿(f1)=w1,￿(f2)=w3 and ￿(f3)=w2 brings the weight 42 for (3,3),57 for (3,1),72
for (1,1) a total of 171. However the following matching ν brings the weight 177 as maximum
ν(f1)=w2, ν(f2)=w3, ν(f3)=w1 with 56 for (2,2),57 for (1,3),64 for (2,1) matches.
By the revelation principle, we can focus on the matching mechanisms under rank-order list
submission games. Stability of a mechanism appears as a cooperative, complete information issue.
A matching is stable if and only if it is in the core of the mechanism rank-order list submission
game. Theory also implies that there exist no incentive-compatible mechanisms under complete
information.
Appendix B. Proofs (Section 4)
S k e t c ho fP r o o fo fL e m m a1 :Consider the strategy s which tells ￿rms, not to make any
oﬀers in rounds −2 and −1; which tells workers, not to accept any oﬀers in rounds −2 and −1;a n d
which tells a high type ￿rm (worker) to rank only 3 high type workers (￿rms) in its (her) rank-order
list, a low type ￿rm (worker) to list all 6 workers (￿rms) in (her) rank-order list in accordance with
its (her) true preferences in round 0.D e n o t et h i sp r o ￿le with Q.N o ws leaves no one unmatched,
causes no mismatches and does not involve any early contracts.
Now, we need to show that s is an equilibrium.
(i) This strategy gives the same outcome with the truthful revelation equilibrium of the direct
revelation game. A similar proof to the proof of lemma 3 can show that Q is an equilibrium of the
round 0 subgame. Since nobody else makes early contracts, one￿s deviation in round −2 or −1 will
not change her payoﬀ.S o ,s is an equilibrium for the DA mixed game.
28(ii) We will give the proof only for the Newcastle priority mixed game. Consider the following
most pro￿table deviation from s:a na g e n tv omits the last ranked agent in Q(v) from her rank-
order list, and all other nodes of this strategy coincide with those of s(v).N o t et h a tad e v i a t i o nt o
early oﬀers or acceptances do not change the payoﬀ of an agent given that no one else is making
early oﬀers or accepting early oﬀers.
Suppose a high worker w omits her third choice i.e. plays Q0(w)=( f1,f 2) while Q(w)=
(f1,f 2,f 3).16 This will result no change for pro￿les where she was matched to her top choice. It











u>u 0 if and only if 183uw(f3) > 8uw(f2) since uw(w)=0 .
uw(f2) − uw(f3) < 2 and uw(f3) > 0 imply that the inequality holds in our model. Early oﬀers
do not pro￿t w, while everybody else is playing s−w.
The Newcastle mechanism does not treat ￿r m sa n dw o r k e r ss y m m e t r i c a l l y . A(k,l) match is
favored before an (a,b) match if k ￿ l = a￿ b and k<a . That is, workers￿ preferences are favored
over ￿rms￿ in cases of ties in the product numbers between two matches.
Suppose a high ￿rm f omits its third choice i.e. it plays Q0(f)=( w1,w 2) when Q(f)=
(w1,w 2,w 3). This will result with also some changes for the pro￿les where it was matched to its










u>u 0 if and only if 718uf(w3) > 37uf(w1)+5 6 uf(w2) since uf(f)=0 .
uf(w1) − uf(w3) < 2, uf(w2) − uf(w3) < 2 and uf(w3) > 0 imply that the inequality holds in
our model. Early oﬀers do not pro￿t f, while everybody else is playing s−f.
Similar statements can be stated for a low type worker and a low type ￿rm deviations. We
have shown that s is an equilibrium of the Newcastle priority mixed game. Since the Birmingham
mechanism is dual to Newcastle￿s, a proof changing roles of ￿rms and workers will work. Reader
can verify the lemma for the Edinburgh￿67 mechanism.
Sketch of Proof of Lemma 2: Consider any symmetric strategy pro￿le s with non-empty
rank-order lists. In s in round 0,h i g h￿rms (workers) should list all high workers (￿rms), and low
￿rms (workers) should list all low workers (￿rms) so that there are no mismatches and unmatched
16Let fi denote the i￿th ranked ￿rm in P(w) that is P(w,i)
17One can check all possible preference con￿gurations which occur with equal probability and ￿nd the match of w
in each case to determine the expected payoﬀ.
29agents. Moreover, high agents do not list low agents in round 0, since otherwise mismatches can
occur with positive probability or a low agent can have a more pro￿table deviation from s.N o w
in round −2 or −1, no contracts can occur. Without loss of generality, consider the rank-order
lists of round 0 that consist of high (or low) ￿rms ranking only high (or low) workers in order
with their true preferences, and high (or low) workers ranking only high (or low) ￿rms in order
with their true preferences. This random preference pro￿le e P0can be represented for high ￿rms by
e P0(f)=(e P(f,1), e P(f,2), e P(f,3)),h i g hw o r k e r se P0(w)=(e P(w,1), e P(w,2), e P(w,3)),l o w￿rms by
e P0(f)=(e P(f,4), e P(f,5), e P(f,6)),l o ww o r k e r sb ye P0(w)=(e P(w,4), e P(w,5), e P(w,6)).L e t P0 be
the realization of this pro￿le.
Let f be a high ￿rm with P(f)=( w1,w 2,w 3,w 4,w 5,w 6) only ranking his ￿rst choice by
deviating from these pro￿les where P0(f)=( w1,w 2,w 3). Let this deviation be P00(f)=( w1).
The weights are (actual weights used in London) 36,28,21,15,10,6 for choices ranked 1 to 6.
Let P be a realization of preferences. Now the two matching problems are A =( F,W,P0,￿ LO)
versus B =( F,W,(P00(f),P0
−f),￿ LO) using the London matching mechanism.
Consider any matching ￿ that leaves f unmatched i.e. ￿(f)=f and brings total weight ￿a￿i n
problem B.L e t￿(f0)=w1. Suppose ￿(w)=w for the high worker w.
Consider the following matching ν with ν(f)=w1 this will bring at least (1,3) match weight
36+21 = 57,a n dν(f0)=w this will bring at least (3,3) match weight 21+21 = 42.B u tw em i g h t
have broken at best a (1,1) match between w1 and f0 with a loss of weight 36 + 36 = 72.L e tν
and ￿ match the same agents for the remaining of the market.
ν brings at least 27 points more weight than ￿ in problem B.




H−f](f) <P(f) w1} > 0.
i.e. with positive probability f can be matched to its 2￿nd or 3￿rd choices.
Thus, outcome of B is preferable to A for f.T h e r e f o r e , f has an incentive to truncate its
rank-order list under the symmetric strategy pro￿le mentioned above.
Similarly, it can be stated that a high (or low) agent has incentive to deviate for any symmetric
strategy pro￿le with no mismatches, no early contracts and no unmatched agents.
A symmetric strategy pro￿le cannot constitute an equilibrium with no-early contracts no mis-
matches and non-empty rank-order list submission.
A similar proof can be stated for the Cambridge mechanism.
S k e t c ho fP r o o fo fL e m m a3 :Consider the ￿rm proposing DA mechanism, ￿F.T h el e m m a
can be proven in 3 steps. Let P be the preference pro￿le of agents.
(i) By theorem 4.7 of Roth and Sotomayor (1990), it is dominant for ￿rms to reveal their
30preferences truthfully.
(ii) Consider workers. By corollary 5 by Roth and Rothblum (1999), it is stochastically dom-
inant for worker w to reveal P(w) or truncations of P(w) in response to P−w. First suppose that
w is a high type worker. Let P(w)=( f1,f 2,f 3,f 4,f 5,f 6). Now the potentially most pro￿table
deviation is a truncation as P0(w)=( f1,f 2)










u>u 0 if and only if 88uw(f3) > 23uw(f1)+2 3 uw(f2) since uw(w)=0 .
Now uw(f1) − uw(f3) < 2, uw(f2) − uw(f3) < 2, and uw(f3) > 0 imply that above inequality
holds. So w has the best response P(w) to P−w.
(iii) For a low type worker w, t h em o s tp r o ￿table deviation from P(w)=( f1,f 2,f 3,f 4,f 5,f 6)18











u>u 0 if and only if 88uw(f6) > 23uw(f4)+2 3 uw(f5) since uw(w)=0 .
Now uw(f4) − uw(f6) < 2,u w(f5) − uw(f6) < 2 and uw(f6) > 0 imply that above inequality
holds. So w has the best response P(w) to P−w.
We have shown that P is a strict equilibrium of the direct revelation game of ￿F.
Proof can be modi￿ed by changing roles of ￿rms and workers for the worker proposing DA
mechanism ￿W.
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